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The Moral Economy of Austerity: analysing UK welfare reform. 
Abstract 
This paper notes the contemporary emergence of ‘morality’ in both sociological argument and 
political rhetoric, and analyses its significance in relation to ongoing UK welfare reforms. It revisits 
the idea of ‘moral economy’ and identifies two strands in its contemporary application; that all 
economies depend on an internal moral schema, and that some external moral evaluation is desirable. 
UK welfare reform is analysed as an example of the former, with reference to three distinct 
orientations advanced in the work of Freeden (1996), Laclau (2014), and Lockwood (1996). In this 
light, the paper considers challenges to the reform agenda, drawn from 3rd
 
 sector and other public 
sources. It outlines the forms of argument present in these challenges, based respectively on 
rationality, legality, and morality, which together provide a basis for evaluation of the welfare reforms 
and for an alternative ‘moral economy’.  
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In our intellectual division of labour, treatment of the normative aspects of social life has traditionally 
been the terrain of moral philosophy, both in abstract determinations of right and wrong, and in their 
potential application to concrete ethical dilemmas. However, in recent years sociologists have begun 
to make the case for an approach to morality that is less concerned with the generation and application 
of normative principles, and more with the sources and consequences of varied moral frameworks 
present in society. Such an approach could rest on an examination of the social dynamics at play in 
competing conceptions of social worth (e.g. Sayer, 2005; Skeggs, 2012), on an interrogation of 
socially patterned frameworks of meaning (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013), on the role of dominant interests 
and moral entrepreneurs in drawing moral boundaries (Lukes, 2010), or on analysis of the boundary 
work involved in formulations and justifications of social policy (Atkins, 2010; Steensland, 2006).  
Given this background, Hitlin and Vaisey (2013:53-4) argue that the sociological import of the study 
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of morality lies in the fact that while ‘morality can bind groups together... it can also be the subject of 
negotiation, contestation, and exclusion’. 
One aspect of the implied agenda for research must therefore be a consideration of dominant uses of 
the concept of morality in public life, their implications for (re)shaping the social order, and the form 
and content of challenges to the meanings and judgements they entail. It is perhaps unsurprising that 
these reflections and developments in sociological thinking have run parallel to the emergence of a 
rhetoric of morality in contemporary political parlance. One example is found in the Conservative 
Party’s (2008:12) Responsibilities Agenda, and the assertion that: ‘ending Britain’s welfare culture is 
a moral duty for any progressive government’, reinforced by David Cameron’s (2012) later statement 
that the ensuing welfare reforms were part of a ‘moral mission’ for the country. The present article 
considers the underpinning rationale of this claim, the form and content of the challenges it has 
provoked, and the conceptual tools that can be brought to bear on analysis. 
Moral economy revisited 
As a preliminary to this exercise, it may be helpful to revisit the idea of  ‘moral economy’ as adopted 
by E.P.Thompson (1971) to address the way behaviour in the face of hunger is modified by custom, 
culture and reason. Analysing crowd reaction to food shortages in 18th
The idea of ‘moral economy’ has since been subject to considerable debate and has been taken up and 
applied to contemporary circumstances by a number of writers (Sayer, 2007, 2000; Fassin, 2005, 
2009; Clarke and Newman, 2012), while Booth (1993; 1994) provides a helpful discussion of what is 
 Century England, Thompson 
argued that in almost every case there was a ‘legitimising notion’ at work, ‘informed by the belief that 
they were defending traditional rights or customs...supported by the wider consensus of the 
community’ (p78). This belief was grounded in norms and obligations supported by a paternalist 
model of production and distribution, and by the common law, which in combination constituted the 
moral economy of the poor. Thompson’s analysis was concerned with disturbances that erupted as 
this paternalist model began to break down, and the same conceptual framework was applied in James 
Scott’s (1976) study of rebellion and subsistence in South East Asia.  
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involved in this transposition. Drawing on Polanyi (1957), he sees the core of pre-industrial moral 
economy to rest on the notion of embeddedness, through the non-market integration of economic 
activity into broader social relations and their underpinning values. The model of the modern market 
economy then implies the reverse arrangement, in that society itself becomes embedded in the 
economy and is fashioned accordingly, even to the extent of re-shaping individual behaviour and 
motivations. Booth, however, finds these characterisations to be based on a false dichotomy, and he 
rejects any implication that there is no calculative, maximising behaviour in pre-market societies, 
while also arguing that the market itself is embedded in both a normative and institutional framework. 
Rather he depicts the transition to market society as entailing a normative shift from status to contract, 
and crucially suggests that what is involved in this move is ‘a moral redrawing of the community and 
of the place of the economy within it...a new form of moral embeddedness’ (Booth, 1994:661).  
Based on these reflections, Booth (1994:662) offers the idea of moral economy as both a prompt and a 
language for thinking normatively about the economy, to argue that ‘all economies...are moral 
economies, embedded in the (ethical) framework of their communities’, and so to focus attention on 
role of the economy in the ‘architecture’ of community (p663). This revised sense of ‘moral 
economy’ entails a holistic view of society and the moral presuppositions that underpin its inter-
relations, while ‘moral’ in this context is not an evaluative descriptor of a given arrangement, but an 
element of all socio-economic systems. The appearance of explicit references to morality (as in 
Conservative discourse) is not, therefore, the necessary marker of a moral economy at work. 
However, the appearance of such references at a given moment is a likely indication that some 
significant development is afoot, to be supported by the embedding of an associated value frame. 
Indeed, while  the term ‘moral economy’ was developed to address the breakdown of reciprocal 
arrangements in pre-industrial economies, and its possible linkage to protest and rebellion, moral 
economy investigation can just as well extend to the refashioning of public sentiment to support a 
distinct moral foundation for economic relations.  
It is in this sense that all economies are moral economies, or more accurately that the functioning of 
all economic systems will imply and to some degree depend upon, a particular moral form. Other 
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contemporary moral economy writers have arrived at similar conclusions, and they have in common a 
wish both to recognise the internal moral underpinnings of any economic system, while also holding 
onto the possibility of evaluating such a system from the outside, by independent criteria of value. We 
need, however, to distinguish these  two different strands in contemporary application of the term 
moral economy, which are treated separately in the present article, taking first an illustrative example 
of the claim that all economies are moral economies, and coming later to the question of standards 
and means of contestation. The first strand raises a question as to the process by which re-embedding 
happens, and the second strand, the appropriate criteria for judgement. 
Re-embedding the economy: process 
My illustrative example addresses the moral economy of austerity Britain, and the following 
description is derived from policy documents and speeches from the Conservative wing of the 
Coalition government, in pursuit of their proclaimed ‘moral duty’ to end Britain’s welfare culture. 
The underpinning political argument may be seen as part of a programme to further embed the British 
economy in a supporting morality, enforced by radical reform of the welfare system, and expressed in 
two early papers from the Centre for Social Justice1
Concerns addressed in the first of these documents include growing social security costs, in the face 
of successive failures to ‘get tough on fraudulent claims’ (p13); the alleged causes of dependency - 
family breakdown, educational failure, indebtedness and addiction; the emergent tax credit (TC) 
economy, itself seen as a form of entrenched (worker) dependency; and a need for closer monitoring 
of the economically inactive (disabled and single mothers).  The solution to these problems centres on 
a drive to make work pay by means of an integrated welfare system (SJPG, 2007; Conservative Party, 
2008; Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), 2010; Duncan-Smith, 2012), which combines 
benefits for the workless with the TC system, improves work incentives, increases child care support, 
but enforces tighter conditionality for all groups. This policy programme promises the replacement of 
a culture of dependency with a culture of responsibility, and the construction of a more efficient 
 (Social Justice Policy Group (SJPG), 2006; 
2007), and in subsequent policy. 
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system of delivery and enforcement, through payment by results to private providers operating an 
intensified and incremental system of conditionality and sanctions (Conservative Party, 2008; DWP, 
2010; Finn, 2011). The force of these proposals is captured by the statement that: ‘at present over 80 
per cent of the system remains rights based, placing no real demand on it recipients’ (SJPG, 2007:32) 
The Universal Credit (UC) system (not yet fully implemented) will blur the distinction between in-
work and out-of-work claimants and integrate six main means-tested benefits2, while other reforms to 
these benefits have been established in the mean time3
Cameron’s first prime-ministerial conference speech (2010a) gave some clues to the nature of this ‘re-
embedding’ process, with his intention to ‘change the way we think about ourselves and our role in 
society’, and the rhetoric of key speeches conveys the nature of that change. There are some explicit 
references to an underpinning morality, especially concerning reform of the welfare system, as in 
Cameron’s (2011) response to the urban riots, which warned against ‘moral collapse’ and the risks 
attendant on ‘moral neutrality’ in relation to the ‘moral hazard of welfare’. His conference speech of 
2012 refers to his ‘moral mission’ to cut dependency, citing increased conditionality as the means 
(Cameron, 2012), while his reply to a rebuke from the Archbishop of Westminster made a ‘moral 
, almost all including losses. Key changes 
include: freezing elements of Working Tax Credit from 2011, lowering benefit upratings to 1 per cent 
per year from 2013, with a complete freeze in the next parliament (Guardian, 2014a; Osborne, 2014), 
introduction of a cap on the amount of benefit per household (exempting Working Tax Credit 
recipients), a housing benefit (HB) cut for those ‘underoccupying’ a social rented property, a cap on 
Local Housing Allowance, a reduction in disability support, increased conditionality for the disabled 
in receipt of Employment Support Allowance (ESA), a job-search requirement for single mothers 
whose youngest child is aged 5 or over, abolition of the discretionary social fund, and replacement of 
council tax benefit (CTB) by locally based schemes, many requiring a minimum contribution from 
claimants. Taken together, we see a number of deterrents to reliance on benefits through cuts, freezes, 
and conditionality in the name of a ‘make work pay’ policy, a broadening of the target population for 
conditionality, an associated extension of the category termed ‘dependent’, and by implication an 
erosion of public conceptions of desert. 
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case’ for welfare reform along similar lines (Cameron, 2014). The content of this morality seems best 
translated in Conservative parlance as ‘fairness’, and Cameron adds ‘unfairness’ to Beveridge’s ‘five 
great evils’ (Cameron, 2012).  
The notion of fairness appears repeatedly in Conservative Party speeches since the 2010 election, 
often paired with ‘responsibility’, and is ‘not just about who gets help’ but ‘who gives that help 
through their taxes’ (Cameron, 2010). A variety of speeches from the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, 
and the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions repeat the need to ensure that the out of work 
population is never better placed than ‘hard-working families/people’, and that the welfare system is 
fair to ‘the taxpayer’ (Osborne, 2012), ‘the abused taxpayer (Duncan-Smith, 2013), or ‘the 
hardworking taxpayer’ (Duncan-Smith, 2014). There are associative links, largely by textual 
proximity of reference to the aims of deficit and debt reduction, (eg. Cameron, 2010b) and fraud 
reduction  (eg. Duncan-Smith, 2012), which carry a related moral message.  
The policy approach is largely behavioural, assuming a culture of dependency and seeking to correct 
choices ‘skewed’ by the welfare system, but the objectives are structural, insofar as: ‘Britain cannot 
run a modern flexible economy, if at the same time, so many of the people who service that economy 
are trapped in dependency on the state.’ (Duncan-Smith, 2014). This then is the moral economy of 
austerity under the Coalition government; it is not simply a re-run of traditional moralising about 
welfare claimants, but rather a use of welfare to refashion economic and social relations on a grander 
scale. Undermining support for the vulnerable is thus one means of embedding a particular kind of 
economy, which also entails a change in the balance of power between workers and employers, and a 
worsening of terms and conditions at the lower end of the employment spectrum.  
The rhetorical foundations of society? 
To understand what is happening in this ‘re-embedding’ process we can look to some key figures in 
political theory, and especially to Michael Freeden (1996; 2003) on the study of ideology. In his 
argument, diverse ideologies offer competing interpretations of facts, and each ideology imposes a 
pattern of meaning that is amenable to substantive analysis. Much of the political work involved is to 
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render contestable meanings incontestable, and to give ‘core’ concepts substance through close 
association with ‘adjacent’ concepts, and more loosely with ‘peripheral’ concepts. So Freeden’s 
argument contains an invitation to think in a contextual and indeed sociological way about the role of 
ideology and political rhetoric in shaping society, through a more embedded reading than is offered 
by the abstractions of political philosophy. In the speeches cited above, morality is translated into 
fairness, which then assumes its content by reference to welfare dependency and the hardworking 
taxpayer, in loose association with fraud and deficit reduction. So here we have some of the tools for 
Cameron’s (2010) quest to ‘change the way we see ourselves’, and to ‘shape Britain’ in the course of 
a shift from irresponsibility to austerity (Cameron, 2009). 
 A further theoretical resource for thinking about this process comes from a different tradition, as 
outlined in the work of Ernesto Laclau (2014) in his exploration of The Rhetorical Foundations of 
Society. Both Laclau and Freeden share a view that the role of ideology in social and political life is 
not so much to mask reality as to shape the way we see it, and in so doing to (re)order aspects of the 
social world. While Freeden looks at how the contestable is decontested through core and adjacent 
concepts, Laclau writes of the creation of an absent fullness in the very idea of society, ‘projecting 
into something that is essentially divided the illusion of a fullness and self-transparency’ (2014:15). In 
his account, this is achieved through the construction of a chain of equivalential meanings, whose 
purpose is to give substance to an unachievable promise - as in the  moral pursuit of fairness in the 
name of hardworking tax payers, set against dependency, deficit and fraud. In Laclau’s terms, such a 
discursive configuration should be understood as an attempt to close off meaning, in effect stabilising 
an illusory sense of cohesion and incarnating the impossible ‘fullness’ of society. In practice, 
however, the logic of equivalence requires constant negotiation, and for Laclau this reaches its limit in 
the face of a clear contradiction – as might for example occur when claims to fairness are implicated 
in the creation of destitution. 
While these arguments seem rather distant from the constitution and ordering of the social world, 
there is one further framework that makes the process more sociologically accessible, and that is 
David Lockwood’s (1996) concept of civic stratification. This work is implicitly concerned with the 
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construction of ‘moral standing’ in society and explores the relations between possession or absence 
of rights and access to ‘moral and material resources’. Briefly put, the argument is that a regime of 
rights can both shape and be shaped by the moral standing of a given group in society such that an 
erosion of standing can undermine the enjoyment of, or claim to rights (civic deficit or civic 
exclusion), while the denial of rights further erodes moral standing. The converse would also apply, in 
that the accrual of moral standing in society, perhaps through the intervention of civic activists, can 
lead to an expansion of rights, or to enhanced enjoyment of a right (civic expansion or civic gain). In 
the case of welfare reform, we see an erosion of moral standing for a social category of ‘dependence’, 
its expansion to include the working poor, and its use to question the validity of ‘inactivity’ as a basis 
for support, all set against the moral ascendancy of the hard-working tax-payer and harnessed in the 
cause of legitimising cuts to welfare spending and entitlement. 
The three figures mentioned above come from very different traditions of social and political thought, 
selected for the way they each work at distinct levels and offer different tools for understanding how 
ideology and rhetoric can operate as social forces. Freeden provides a key to understanding the 
internal mechanics of a political ideology through the claim to bring definitive, substantive meaning 
to abstract principles; Laclau’s focus is rather on how political forces build their constituencies by 
forging patterns of equivalence and difference, and lines of opposition, which shape the nature and 
structure of society itself; while Lockwood traces the moral sentiment generated by such political 
manoeuvres down to the dynamic construction of civic standing. So there is a certain complementarity 
between the three approaches sketched out here, each highlighting the way that moral and political 
sentiment can influence the functioning of social relations, but each also containing scope for 
movement in the form of challenges to the emergent moral and social order.  
As Norval (2000) has argued, ideologies are struggles over socially legimated meanings of political 
concepts, and the scholar’s task is to investigate why one decontestation prevails over another at any 
given time, pointing to the process by which a moral economy is embedded, or indeed undermined. 
With regard to the latter, Lockwood notes the role of civic activists in enhancing the moral standing of 
certain groups and pushing for an expansion of their rights, while Freeden recognises that new sources 
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of ideological creativity are likely to be found in pressure group activity. Though Freeden sees that 
this may be fragmented, and produce only a patchwork of alternative thinking, Laclau argues that the 
particularity of any given claim can become the occasion for a more general confrontation – 
especially if connections can be made between different subject groups. Of course, while 
demonstrating in their different ways how ideologies work, none of these approaches draws 
conclusions or indeed offers guidance as to whether they are good or bad, right or wrong. It may 
therefore be instructive in what remains of this article to consider the nature of challenges to the 
Conservative moral mission, their form and foundations, and their implications for an alternative 
conception of a moral economy. 
Challenging austerity: judgement 
If ideology, discourse and rhetoric serve to decontest key concepts and close off meaning, how are 
they to be challenged, and must a challenge necessarily take the form of a counter-rhetoric? Freeden 
(2003) argues that ideologies are in fact illusory wholes, made up of fragmented facts and competing 
values, and while Laclau sees ideological closure as both impossible but necessary to politics, 
Lockwood envisages social struggles over the moral standing of groups that are targeted by specific 
policy measures. These elements together suggest spaces of (re)contestation which need not be 
expressed as a fully formed counter-rhetoric, and a strategy for research is then implicit in Luke’s 
(2010) call to focus on both dominant elites and moral entrepreneurs, and their role in shaping and 
sustaining moral codes. Hence, his interest in the ‘manifold ways in which individuals and social 
groups escape and resist’ (p554) dominant influences.  
In fact, the attempt by political ideology to control representation and interpretation does not mean 
evidence cannot be brought to bear in evaluating rhetorical positions, or indeed in constructing 
alternative orientations. Freeden, Laclau and Lockwood each hint at how this might happen, whether 
through recontesting key concepts, challenging equivalential chains, or revalorising vulnerable 
groups, and each also gestures towards a likely role for third sector/civil society actors in such a 
process. With this in mind, we can explore the form and content of challenges to the UK austerity 
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agenda emerging from these sources, and a close reading of third sector responses, supplemented by 
academic, press, and official monitoring4, reveals three broad categories of critique. Defined by the 
form and content of their argument, these are based respectively on rationality, legality, and morality, 
which also contain echoes of the theoretical possibilities outlined above. 
Rationality
While ideology may represent an attempt to control meaning, it can be judged with reference to both 
its internal coherence and its exclusions, as supported by Freeden’s (2003:95) view of ideologies as 
‘illusory wholes’, and Laclau’s recognition that chains of equivalence eventually encounter a 
‘resistance of meaning’ (2014:36). A rationality critique therefore challenges the rhetoric of welfare 
reform as fairness and morality in its own terms – with reference to its targets, objectives, outcomes, 
and internal logic.  
  
One critique looks to the focus of emphasis in the welfare reforms and their presentation, and there 
has been recent comment on the classification and calculation of ‘welfare’ spending itself (Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS), 2014a; Guardian, 2014b; Economist, 2014). Thus, the Treasury statement of 
account5 to taxpayers was criticised for submerging the 14 per cent of government spending dedicated 
to working age benefits (the target of reforms), within the 25 per cent designated as total welfare 
spending (including personal care services and public service pensions not normally classed as 
welfare, but excluding state pensions). Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG)6 placed these numbers in 
fuller perspective by circulating Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis figures (PESA, 2014, Table 
5.2) that show unemployment benefit to account for only 0.7 per cent of total public expenditure on 
services, with HB at 3.8 per cent, TC’s at 4.3 per cent, and Sickness/Disability at 6.8 per cent. Others 
have challenged as misleading any pairing of concern about welfare spending with references to fraud 
(eg. SJPG, 2006; Duncan-Smith, 2012), in that the £2.4 billion overpaid to benefit claimants7 is less 
than one third of total unclaimed benefits (Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion (CESI), 2014), 
and pales to insignificance against the (growing) £34 billion of unpaid tax (Guardian, 2014c)8. So 
here is a rationality critique that highlights distortion in the focus of attention and effort in welfare 
11 
 
reform, and greatly weakens the chain of association between fairness, benefit cuts and deficit 
reduction. 
Fairness is also placed in contestation by the Centre for Welfare Reform (Duffy, 2014), which shows 
that despite a government commitment to make cuts fairly, 36 per cent fall on people in poverty, who 
make up 20 per cent of the population and are less able to bear them (cf. De Agostini et al, 2014), 
with a greater skew against the disabled and social care users. Indeed, it is argued that many cuts are 
perverse in generating new social costs, and that likely outcomes are increased personal debt and 
family breakdown - ‘pathways to dependency’ the government seeks to address (SJPG, 2006). Other 
bodies (e.g. Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC), 2014) note a significant number of 
claimants are affected by multiple cuts, and there are calls for a cumulative impact assessment which 
would further undermine claims to ‘fairness’. Thus, Oxfam (2014) point out that changes to CTB and 
HB have meant some families are making payments from subsistence benefits already undermined by 
reduced upratings, and several organisations (Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF), 2014a; Church 
Action on Poverty (CAP)/Oxfam, 2013; Oxfam, 2014) question whether a guaranteed subsistence 
level any longer exists, putting at issue a long standing principle of the welfare system.  
More detailed argument (Oxfam, 2014) looks to fragmentation and contradiction in the perverse effect 
of specific measures, which may collide with other aspects of policy. For example, several bodies 
show welfare reform to have a deleterious effect on child poverty figures (IFS, 2011; Social Mobility 
and Child Poverty Commission (SMCPC), 2014), leaving projections far short of statutory goals for 
reducing child poverty, to which the government is legally committed. Implementation of the under-
occupancy penalty (bedroom tax) has also encountered difficulties, in part because of insufficient 
smaller alternative properties (JRF, 2014b)9. This has created problems for local authorities, 
sometimes meaning loss of revenue, while the penalty has had a particularly severe impact on 
disabled tenants10. The cap on the overall amount of benefits a household can receive11 is also flawed 
in that one rationale for this policy is fairness to the average earner, while another is to incentivise 
employment, yet Oxfam (2014) point out that 40 per cent of those affected are on income support and 
cannot work because of caring responsibilities, while a quarter are in receipt of ESA (an incapacity 
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benefit). Indeed, the Work Capability Assessment has itself been discredited (Guardian, 2012), while 
performance of the Work Programme has fallen far short of expectations for this group.12
Work incentives have a central place in the welfare reform agenda, but SSAC (2014) point to the 
perverse effect of reforms in undermining the aim to ‘make work pay’ when 59 per cent of reductions 
fall on households with someone in work. Though IFS (2014b) calculations on the impact of UC find 
that taken in isolation the new system would significantly reduce relative poverty, they show this is 
more than offset by the poverty increasing effect of other changes. A JRF (2014c) study reports that 
half of adults in poverty are living in households with someone in work, and a number of 
organisations set the ‘make work pay’ policy against deteriorating labour market conditions (e.g. 
Oxfam, 2012). While ONS figures for October 2014 showed unemployment at its lowest since 2008 
and employment rates close to an all time high at 73%, the fall in unemployment was partly through 
increased inactivity rates (Guardian, 2014d), and the TUC have recorded the worst fall in wages since 
the 1920’s 
  
13
Much attention in relation to rationality and perversity has focused on heightened conditionality and 
sanctions in the delivery of benefits, steadily increasing from the 1980’s onwards (Finn, 2011; 
Wiggan, 2012; Dwyer and Wright, 2014) but with particular intensity under the Coalition. As of 
October 2012 (DWP, 2013), a  minimum sanction withholds benefit for four weeks, and a maximum 
sanction for three years, also removing clients from the claimant count for the relevant period. A 
common criticism of the approach is a tension between advising and coercing (Grant, 2014), while 
payment of providers by results is thought to have perverse effects in creaming off the most 
employable and ‘parking’ the hard to help, many of whom have complex mental or social problems 
(Grant 2014; Finn, 2011; Manchester Citizen’s Advice Bureau (CAB), 2013; Guardian, 2014g). 
. Commentators also stress the rise in zero-hours contracts, increased temporary working, 
and reluctant part-time work and self-employment (Oxfam, 2012; Clark, 2014; Guardian, 2014e ), the 
latter hitting its highest level for 40 years (Guardian, 2014f). The UC system is to some extent 
designed to accommodate this ‘flexible’ labour market, but the SMCPC (2014) express concern that 
children will simply move between low income workless households and low income working 
households, with little change in their living standards.  
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SSAC (2006) has previously questioned how far claimants fully understand the functioning of the 
system, while and a report from Manchester CAB (2013) found one quarter of those sanctioned did 
not know why, and 40 per cent had not received written confirmation.  
The rationale of the sanctions system is undermined by a report (Oakley, 2014) that a prime provider 
found one in three clients had health issues, mental health problems, or a learning disability, and that 
after review and appeal only 28.7 per cent of referrals turned into actual sanctions. Some claimants, 
especially from more vulnerable groups, lacked clear understanding of the requirements being placed 
on them, and correspondence was overly long and legalistic. Given the aim of behavioural change, it 
is unsurprising that the report finds poor communication could yield this endeavour ineffective, while 
some go further to speak of knowingly tormenting the poor (Webster, 2013). There is concern that 
families could become cut off both from work and from state support (Oakley, 2014; JRF, 2014), 
while the system is also thought to produce a high degree of recycling of claimants moving on and off 
benefits (SMCPC, 2014; JRF/NPI, 2013). Though this is something UC aims to accommodate, in so 
doing it supports insecurity and poor pay, while also bringing an additional group of low paid workers 
under the stigmatising effect of conditionality and sanctions, eroding their moral standing. 
In sum, the ‘rationality’ critique undermines government rhetoric not by an explicit counter-rhetoric 
but by questioning the rationale of policy against evidence and experience, to show that underlying 
assumptions may be poorly grounded, and that measures may be self-defeating or in conflict with 
other established objectives. So while an ideological position and its supporting rhetoric are about 
shaping the way we see the world, their associated policies can nevertheless be assessed in terms of 
coherence and ‘rationality’. While these arguments do not constitute a full-blown counter-rhetoric, 
they do point to another way of seeing, highlighting flaws internal to welfare reform rhetoric and 
alerting us to the illusory nature of some of the claims being made, recalling Laclau’s ‘impossible 
fullness’ and Freeden’s ‘illusory wholes’.  
Legality 
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A ‘legality’ critique adopts a similar form of argument, but goes further than the ‘rationality’ 
approach by asking how far policy is consistent with established legal obligations, which means the 
courts will often play a determining role. This critique places government policy within a framework 
of institutionalised commitments that may have accumulated over time, though legality is itself an 
uncertain field, especially in unfolding areas of the law such as universal human rights, one of 
Freeden’s (1996:59) fields of contestability.  
In relation to welfare reform and austerity politics, one element of contestation lies in attempts to give 
a stronger role to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and 
bring concrete meaning to existing formal obligations. The UK is a signatory to this Covenant but has 
resisted signing the optional protocol that secures an individual complaints-mechanism. ICESCR 
includes the right to an adequate standard of living, and a range of associated rights, all of which 
should be exercised without discrimination (General Comment 20). In particular, Article 2 requires a 
signatory state to ‘take steps... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized...’. There is a strong presumption against 
retrogression, which must be justified by reference to the totality of rights and full use of available 
resources (General Comment 3), so the latter itself presents a basis for challenge (see Elson, 2012), 
but also scope for varying interpretation.  
Much contestation has focussed on the non-discrimination requirement under ICESCR, challenging 
the fairness agenda by showing the burden of cuts falls particularly on women (Elson, 2012) and 
people with disabilities (Butterworth and Burton, 2013).  It has also been argued that reforms have 
been introduced ‘to pursue a moral agenda of individual initiative’, with the government in breach of 
obligations imposed by the international human right to food (Justfair, 2014). Yet as Palmer (2010)  
notes: ‘There remains a deeply embedded conviction that matters of public finance and resource 
allocation...are the preserve of the elected branches of government and not of the courts.’ However, 
despite government resistance to accepting the justiciability of social and economic rights, there have 
been several cases that challenge elements of welfare reform by recourse to domestic law, and to 
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rights protected by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (enshrined in the Human 
Rights Act (HRA)).  
Legal judgments offer an underexploited means of access to contestation over the implementation of 
policy, and in this process courts become a forum for contextual interpretation of the law through the 
lived experience of its subjects. Two cases are selected here for comment, given their engagement 
with central elements of the welfare reform, the nature of the issues raised, and the significant role 
played by third sector organisations. The case SG and Ors v SSWP [2015] UKSC 16, with 
interventions from CPAG and Shelter, challenges the benefits cap on behalf of two single parents, 
both with a child under 5 and both having suffered sexual abuse and domestic violence. The case 
rested on the discriminatory effects of the cap on single parents and victims of domestic violence, 
with respect to rights under the ECHR/HRA, but much of the deliberation turns on a consideration of 
‘fairness’. Here the intervention by CPAG (2015) is of particular interest, offering a clear instance of 
Freeden’s (1996) argument.  
The position set out by CPAG on behalf of the appellants argues that ‘fairness’ has been emptied of 
content (para 15), given that the comparison between capped benefit income and that of an average 
earner disregards benefits available to such earners. The cap applies regardless of family size and 
includes within its scope benefits paid on behalf of children, contravening the idea of a level playing 
field between working and workless families (para 12). Furthermore, the aim of incentivising 
employment through income differentials is weakened by the existence of such differentials prior to 
the imposition of a cap (para 40). The government seeks to place ‘fairness’ beyond contention, 
defending the legitimate objectives of the cap as introducing fairness to tax-payers into the welfare 
system, making financial savings, tackling a culture of dependency, and incentivising employment. 
However, this position is advanced despite the fact that mothers of children under 5 are not normally 
expected to seek work.  The government argue that possible exemptions were discussed and rejected 
by Parliament (UKSC 16, paras 40-43) and that exclusion of child related benefits would ‘emasculate 
the scheme’ (para 127). Giving considerable weight to the will of parliament (paras 92-96), the 
Supreme Court (with two judges dissenting) found the discriminatory effects of the cap to be justified. 
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However, three of the five judges expressed concern about non-compliance with the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, while one observed that the cap ‘breaks the link between 
benefit and need’ (para 180).   
A further case warrants mention, as one that did eventually lead to an over-riding of Parliament in 
relation to the Coalition’s Work Programme and implementation of the Employment Skills and 
Enterprise Scheme, under which claimants could be required to participate in work related schemes, 
including unpaid work. The case was brought with the support of Public Interest Lawyers, and 
succeeded in the Court of Appeal on the charge that the 2011 governing regulations were ultra vires, 
failing to provide details of the relevant schemes or the requirement of participation. The regulations 
were therefore quashed, though the judge found against a claim of forced labour. The case was 
appealed by both respondents and appellants in the Supreme Court (Reilly and Wilson v SSWP 
[2013] UKSC 68), but Parliament meanwhile retrospectively validated the 2011 Regulations, also 
adding descriptions of the seven schemes in operation. The Supreme Court found that the 2011 
Regulations had provided insufficient information about the relevant schemes, that the first 
respondent was given no written notice, and that the details given to the second respondent were 
inadequate – though he was sanctioned with loss of benefits for failure to participate.  
The issue again turned on a question of ‘fairness’, and this point is made repeatedly in the judgment, 
both in relation to the claimants and as a matter of public interest (e.g. paras 64 and 66), though the 
court again found against a claim of forced labour. However, there was follow-up litigation (Reilly 
and Hewstone v SSWP [2014] EWHC 2182 (Admin)) on the fact that the 2011 Regulations governing 
the scheme were validated retrospectively by Parliament while the case was ongoing, pre-empting 
decisions on 2,512 pending appeals against unlawful sanctions, in favour of the DWP (paras 49 and 
102). The High Court found this retrospective validation to be incompatible with the right to a fair 
trial for the respondents (Article 6, HRA), meaning that any pending appeals against sanctions were 
likely to succeed (as illustrated by Hewstone). The judge takes issue with descriptions of the 
claimants in Parliamentary debate, noting: ‘It would be unjust to categorise the claimants in Reilly 
No.1 as those “who have not engaged with attempts made by the state to return them to work” and 
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who should therefore “face the appropriate consequences rather than receiving an undeserved 
windfall”, as Lord Freud put it.’ (para 126). The whole saga takes as a central concern conceptions of 
fair treatment, and the judgment gives prominent place to what we can term the ‘moral standing’ of 
the claimants, as in the civic stratification framework.  
While these illustrative cases fall short of complete success, both are significant in seeking to give 
content to the concept of fairness, elaborating an alternative interpretation and rendering its meaning 
contestable. They also, in different ways, seek to establish the moral standing of the claimants 
involved against a discourse of dependency and dis-merit, and so to correct the negative dynamic at 
play in relation to civic stratification.  
The rationality critique is clearly limited in functioning within the terms of a given policy or set of 
policies, and thus making no challenge to the wider context in which such policy functions. Legality 
goes a little further, contesting key issues and principles, but nevertheless operates within a given 
social and institutional context. However, the rationality and legality arguments outlined above do 
have an implicit moral content, which becomes more apparent in third sector documentation that takes 
its force from experience, and recontests morality as the prevention of human suffering. Thus, in a 
letter to the Daily Mirror
Morality 
14, 27 Anglican Bishops and 16 other faith leaders state that the Prime 
Minister has ‘an acute moral imperative to act’ on growing numbers going hungry, describing the 
government’s welfare cuts as a ‘national crisis’ and a ‘disgrace’. The letter cites 5,500 people 
admitted to hospital in the UK for malnutrition, mothers skipping meals to feed their children, and 
many facing the choice to heat or eat. It also states: ‘Britain is the world’s seventh largest economy 
and yet people are going hungry...over half of the people using foodbanks have been put in that 
situation by cut backs to and failures in the benefit system...’ The founder of the End Hunger Fast 
campaign15 similarly comments that: ‘For David Cameron to defend what is happening in the welfare 
system as part of his “moral mission” when the reality is that hundreds of thousands of Britain’s have 
been left hungry is truly shocking’.  
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Such an approach overrides arguments based on ‘fairness’, and comes closer to the notion of a moral 
absolute based on survival needs (see Shue, 1996; Justfair, 2014). The background to this argument is 
provided by a number of reports documenting poverty and suffering in the UK; the ESRC funded 
Poverty and Social Exclusion project (2013) found that even before the effect of cuts were felt  9 per 
cent of households (2.3 million) could not afford to heat living areas of their home, over half a million 
children (4 per cent) lived in families that could not afford to feed them properly, and over 3.5 million 
adults (8 per cent) could not afford to eat properly themselves. Two IFS reports (2014; 2011) 
respectively found that 14.6 million people (23.2 per cent) were in absolute poverty (measured after 
housing costs), and that by 2020 absolute child poverty is set to rise by 9.6 per cent16
While the uprating of benefits was reduced for a second time in April 2014 (with further reduction 
planned), the cost of a ‘minimum basket of goods’ (a standard poverty measure) was found by JRF to 
have risen by between one quarter and one third from 2008 to 2014 (JRF, 2014a), and we have noted 
the impact of cuts to CTB and HB in requiring payments from subsistence income. Commonly 
recognised effects (Duffy, 2014; Oxfam, 2012) are reliance on loan sharks, financially punitive use of 
bailiffs for debt collection, and growing dependence on food banks, with the Trussell Trust reporting 
over 900,000 users for 2013-14. The Trust found the main causes to be benefit delays (30 per cent), 
low income (20 per cent) and benefit changes (16 per cent),
 (see also 
Guardian, 2014h). 
17 and now issues kettle boxes to clients 
who cannot afford to run their cooker, and provides a cold box that does not require any fuel 
(Guardian, 2014i). The response to a Church of England (Sentamu (ed), 2015) call for renewed 
commitment to solidarity and ‘the commonality of the human journey’ (p29), was an emphasis on job 
creation and a strong economy18
The conclusion drawn by several organisations (JRF, 2014a; Oxfam, 2013; 2014) is that: ‘the social 
safety net is failing in its basic duty to ensure that families have access to sufficient income to feed 
themselves adequately’ (CAP/Oxfam, 2013). In an echo of the moral economy of subsistence 
societies (Scott, 1976), the implicit judgment is that the means of basic survival is an absolute right 
that overrides policy concerns, a view also aired in a Parliamentary debate on the use of foodbanks: 
. For Sentamu et al, the economy is not enough. 
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‘The final verdict on any government is how they treat the poorest in society during the hardest of 
times. The rise in need for foodbanks is a horrifying indictment’19
Their accounts of the experience and effects of welfare reform feed into a debate about purpose, and 
Wiggan (2012) writes of ‘the subordination of social policy to the goals of economic policy’, such 
that organisations like Oxfam (2012) signal a need to ‘rethink what we value as a society’. This 
orientation moves us from an analysis of the ‘moral economy’ internal to the rhetoric of the Coalition 
government, to an external evaluation of the morality of its aims and effects, or in Booth’s (1993) 
terms, restores the question of telos to economic thinking. Here we find an attempt to claim the 
language of morality for a different set of objectives, and one step in this direction is to shift the 
emphasis away from the behavioural assumptions and disciplinary measures that underpin attacks on 
‘dependency culture’. The alternative is to look instead to securing ‘fairness’ through guaranteed 
standards in both employment and subsistence, coming closer to a capabilities approach to rights that 
looks to human flourishing and dignity (Sen, 2005). This might be construed as a different way of 
seeing, and at least in part as an exercise in revalorising the poor, offsetting the negative elements of 
civic stratification bred by a stigmatising conception of dependency. Such an approach would place 
the realisation of human potential at the heart of public policy by taking fellowship as the 
motivational basis for social co-operation, and endorsing a list of basic capabilities as the appropriate 
goal (see Nussbaum 2007). 
. Although benefit sanctions are one 
factor fuelling their use, Webster (2013:11) reports that no impact assessment was deemed necessary 
for the 2012 Job Seekers Alllowance Regulations that tightened sanctions, because ‘they impose no 
cost to the private sector or civil society organisations’. There is an implicit challenge here to the 
divisions which underpin this kind of auditing, and it has the potential to move beyond a questioning 
of administrative calculation to engage in what Nussbaum (2007) terms the cultivation of compassion 
- which she also views as indispensible to legal rationality. Her argument is an attempt to bridge 
social divides through a morality of common humanity, and the civil society actors who document the 
suffering that flows from a punitive constriction of welfare are all in some way engaged in this 
endeavour. 
20 
 
Following Will Hutton (2014), such an exercise could begin with recognition that ‘public services and 
safety nets are not inconvenient social burdens’ but are a ‘collectively owned means of guarding 
against the hazards and risks that every human might confront’. Others seek to challenge the ‘deficit 
scare’ as a justification for shrinking the state at the expense of the most vulnerable, and for cutting 
benefits while reducing taxation for the better off  (Keegan, 2014; De Agostini et al, 2014). There is 
also a reframing of dependency by looking to subsidies for ‘too big to fail’ banks (Chakrabortty, 
2014), to TCs that subsidise employers paying below subsistence wages, to HB that goes to private 
landlords, (Chu, 2014), and by bringing corporate welfare into the picture. Thus, Farnsworth (2013) 
cites the Office of Fair Trading statement that available data do not ‘present a clear view of the total 
amount of subsidy provided by the public sector to private business’, which is surprising given intense 
concern over the measurement of ‘welfare’ spending of every other kind (IFS, 2014a; Economist, 
2014).  
In fact, the classification and definition of subjects and objects of policy are one means by which 
social relations are constituted, as reflected in both the civic stratification model and the construction 
of chains of equivalence, but existing political rhetoric linking deficit, dependency, and morality does 
not extend to corporate supports. Sinfield (2013:31) points to a presentational issue in which: ‘the art 
is being able to present yourself as a ‘giver to’ rather than a ‘taker from’ the state’, and asks who 
really benefits and to what extent from state expenditure. The costs of the bail out to banks left 
outstanding support in 2011 at 31 per cent of GDP (Guardian, 2011), over four times the current 
figure for a year’s spending on working age benefits (IFS 2014a). The moral economy question may 
therefore be framed as thus becomes that of ‘whose economy?’; (Massey and Rustin, 2014); an 
attempt to reverse the arrangement described by Booth (1993) whereby the economy embeds its 
driving goals and values within society. In similar vein, Massey and Rustin (2014:173) argue: 
‘Neoliberalism represents the market economy as virtually coterminous with society itself, as 
determining its entire system of values...(whereas) the economy should be seen as a means to the 
fulfilment of broader human ends.’ (Massey and Rustin, 2014: 173). The comment may be read as an 
implicit invitation to link the purpose of the economy to conceptions of human flourishing, and here 
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the economy is not viewed as a technical matter beyond politics, but rather each government policy is 
seen as one element in a wider narrative, which is accessible to analysis in these terms. The authors 
argue that economic policy must therefore be understood as part of a cultural and ideological struggle, 
whose purpose and values are actively constructed and maintained, and are therefore amenable to 
challenge. Their position arguably contains both a moral and political dimension, in seeking to embed 
economic purpose within human purpose. 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to explore the conceptual tools available for understanding UK welfare reforms 
conducted in the name of morality, and began with a review of contemporary treatments of the 
concept of moral economy. Two strands of argument were identified – one, that all socio-economic 
systems have an underpinning moral schema internal to their functioning, and the other, that some 
external moral evaluation of such systems should be possible. In terms of the first strand, the welfare 
reforms and their underpinning rationale may be seen as an attempt at embedding a supporting set of 
moral presuppositions. For an understanding of this process I have drawn on arguments about the role 
of political ideology and rhetoric in decontesting key concepts (Freeden, 1996) and establishing an 
illusion of coherence and ‘fullness’ (Laclau, 2014), while both approaches can be supplemented by 
Lockwood’s (1996)  view of  ‘moral standing’ and civic stratification. However, such argument raises 
the question of how to evaluate and/or (re)contest such a system - the second strand of the moral 
economy approach.  
We have considered the role of political rhetoric in constructing ‘the way we see ourselves’, but have 
also sought ways to approach such framing in the process of critique. In fact, the work of both 
Freeden and Laclau would seem to support a multi-level approach, which need not be confined to the 
construction of a counter-rhetoric. Drawing on the outputs of third sector organisations, supplemented 
by other public sources, we have seen that policy can be assessed in its own terms, in the form of 
‘rationality’, to contest claims to internal coherence; it can be assessed against an established 
framework of commitments, in the form of ‘legality’, to contest the content of core concepts; and it 
can be assessed against recognition of human dignity and the aim of human flourishing, in the form of 
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‘morality’. These three approaches are of course inter-related, and though ‘morality’ is the closest 
existing argument comes to a counter-rhetoric, it may nevertheless be strongly supported by 
‘rationality’ and ‘legality’, while in combination they might furnish the substance for an alternative 
‘moral economy’, in which the realisation of human potential takes central place. 
  
                                                          
1 Founded by Ian Duncan Smith, currently Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. 
2 Job Seekers Allowance, Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Employment 
Support Allowance (for the disabled), and Income Support (for the economically inactive)   
3 A list of benefit changes under the Coalition is provided by JRF/NPI (2013) 
4 Eg. Social Security Advisory Committee, the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission. 
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/millions-start-receiving-break-down-of-how-their-tax-is-
spent 
6 See pic.twitter.com/yqaYPd08XV 
7 £0.8 billion from official error and £1.6 billion from claimant error 
8 See also http://leftfootforward.org/2015/02/tax-cheats-cost-far-more-than-benefits-cheats-yet-far-
fewer-are-prosecuted/ 
9 http://www.channel4.com/news/bed-tax-forces-people-out-of-homes 
10 See MA and Ors v SSWP [2014] EWCA Civ 13 
11 £500 for a workless family and £350 for a single adult – further reduction is planned 
12 The programme has placed one in ten new claimants for three months or more, but only 2.9% of 
established claimants 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/355896/Work_Progra
mme_Statistical_Release_Sep14_Final.pdf  
13 http://www.tuc.org.uk/economic-issues/labour-market-and-economic-reports/economic-
analysis/britain-needs-pay-rise/uk  
14  http://endhungerfast.co.uk/open-letter-bishops/ 20th February, 2014 
15 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/27-bishops-slam-david-camerons-3164033 
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16 http://www.poverty.ac.uk/editorial/1-4-children-poverty-2020-%E2%80%93-ifs-forecast  
17 http://www.trusselltrust.org/stats 
18 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/11349601/David-Cameron-facing-row-
with-Church-as-he-profoundly-disagrees-with-Archbishops-attack.html 
 
19 HoC Hansard, 18th December, 2013 col 820  
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